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In this paper we use numerical modeling methods to quantitatively assess the impacts of changes in
home bias within regions on the growth of world trade among major blocs over the last three decades.
Existing work focuses on the impacts of trade barrier, transport cost and income changes on trade growth,
rather than preferences. Removing changes in home bias over the last three decades from our global
general equilibrium model reduces world trade by 27% compared to actual world trade in 2004 in
our central case scenario. These results support the view that world trade among major blocs has became
more regionalized rather than internationalized which we suggest may be due to a proliferation of
free trade agreements. We calibrate a simple global trade model of inter bloc trade to both 1975 and
2004 data and substitute different calibrated parameters from the two data sets between model parameterizations.
Our results suggest that if changes over time in home bias involving different regionally sourced goods
in a multi-region multi product model are removed, substantial effects follow for the growth of world
trade in the last three decades. Home bias changes in developed and developing economies reduce
world trade by 8% and 19% respectively, suggesting that regionalization is more pronounced in developing
country trade. Our results also indicate that income growth, income convergence, and falling trade
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1.  Introduction 
    In this paper we analyze the impacts of changing preferences for different regionally 
sourced goods over the last 3 decades in a global Armington model of trade and production 
involving major trading blocs which is calibrated to both 1975 and 2004 data. Contrary to the 
conventional view that globalization is fuelling world trade growth, we find a trend of 
international trade regionalization among blocs. Our results suggest that pro region product 
preference changes in the last three decades may have reduced world trade by 27% relative to 
2004 levels (US$ 1.7 trillion), with separate preference changes in developed and developing 
economies reducing world trade by 8% and 19%, respectively. We interpret these results as 
indicating that regionalization, perhaps due to a growing role for regional trade agreements, is 
growing in importance in the global economy. Results also indicate that income growth 
(modeled by allowing regional endowments to grow at the same rate), income convergence, and 
falling trade costs explain 76%, 4%, and 7% of the growth of world trade in the last three 
decades, respectively. 
We generate these results using a numerical general equilibrium model of the global 
economy. We use a pure exchange model to allow us to concentrate on demand side effects. In 
this model we group the world into 8 regions, the EU (25), developed North America (the U.S.  4
and Canada), Japan, developed Oceania (Australia and New Zealand), developing America, 
developing Africa, developing Asia and Oceania, other Europe and CIS. We use 3-level nested 
CES (constant elasticity of substitution) preferences to represent each region’s preference 
structure. We then assess the impacts of various changes in preferences on the growth of world 
trade.  
 
    Classical trade theory typically focuses on the determinants of international trade in a 
variety of models; Ricardian, specific factors, Heckscher-Ohlin, and monopolistically 
competitive (market structure). World trade has increased by 10 times (in nominal terms) over 
the last three decades and a growing literature attempts to explain this rapid growth (Deardorff 
(1984), Leamer and Levinsohn (1995), Krugman (1995)). Trade liberalization (reduction of 
trade barriers), transportation cost reductions, income convergence and economic growth are 
the four most cited factors in this literature. (Helpman (1987), Hummels and Levinsohn 
(1995)) .More recently, Yi (2003), Feenstra (1998), Hummels, Rapoport and Yi (1998) have also 
stressed the role of outsourcing (vertical specialization, or disintegration of production) in 
surging international trade flows. Baier and Bergstrand (2001) decompose international trade 
growth in OECD countries using a gravity model. Their results show that income convergence 
explains little of the world trade growth, while income growth, reductions in tariffs and 
transportation costs explain 67%, 26%, and 8% respectively of the growth. These three factors  5
also collectively explain around 40% of the variation in trade growth leaving the remaining 60% 
unexplained.  
As noted by Leamer and Levinsohn (1995) conventional trade models largely concentrate 
on production side sources of comparative advantage. Only a small number of studies, 
originating with Linder (1961) and reflected in recent applications of the gravity model, attempt 
to investigate the determinants of trade from the demand-side
1.  Armington (1969) type 
general equilibrium trade models assume that different country source goods are imperfect 
substitutes in demand and that this gives rise to trade between countries.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model that we use to explore the 
impacts of preference changes on world trade. The data we use in calibration of the numerical 
model to 1975 and 2004 benchmarks are also reported. In section 3 counterfactual experiment 
results assessing the impact of changing preferences on world trade growth are set out. Section 
4 draws conclusions and briefly discusses further issues.  
                                                        
1 Using a gravity model and econometric methods Baier and Bergstrand (2005) also find that free 
trade agreements increase members’ trade but the effects of FTAs on members’ trade with nonmembers 
and trade among nonmembers is not analyzed.  
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2. A Global Numerical General Equilibrium Model, Data, and Model Calibration 
Model Structure 
We use a numerical pure exchange global general equilibrium model of 8 blocs (or regions) 
in which each region is endowed only with one good to explore the impact of preference 
changes on the growth of world trade. These are the EU (25), the US and Canada, Japan, 
Developed Oceania, Developing America, Developing Africa, Developing Asia Oceania, and 
other Europe and US. The use of a pure exchange model of this simplified form allows us to 
focus centrally on demand-side factors behind world trade growth. We incorporate 3 level 
nested CES preferences in all regions. In the model prices and trade flows are endogenously 
determined with regional endowments exogenously given.  
Each region is assumed to have representative consumer who maximizes utility by first 
choosing among home and foreign goods as composites. Each region then chooses among two 
different composite foreign country goods at a 2
nd level, from developed and developing 
economies. At the bottom level of the nesting structure, each region then chooses further 
among individual developed and developing economy goods. The additional nesting among 
developed and developing countries allows for a separate determination of home bias effects in 
those two groups of regions.   7
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where s is a typical region, and i∈(s, s*), where s* represents foreign goods for all other regions 
than s represented as a single composite good.  si α is the first-stage Armington share parameter, 
si x is region s’s consumption of goods supplied by region i; and 
s σ (=1/(1-
s ρ )) is the elasticity 
of substitution between home and foreign goods in region s.  
Each of the five regions faces a top level budget constraint involving home and foreign 
goods, written as   
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,                 ( 2 )  
where  s X is the endowment of region s own good,  s p  is the price of the region s own good, 
s I is the income of region s (determined by the endowment of region specific goods, prices, 
and inter-regional transfers, if any);  * ss p is the regional aggregate price index of foreign goods 
consumed by s, which in turn is given by a true cost of living price index constructed using the 
second and third level preferences for the region; and ss p is the price of home goods.  
First order conditions yield top level consumption of home and foreign goods in region s, 
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Second level preferences involve two foreign country composite goods for each region s 
reflecting aggregation of the 8 regions in the model into developed and developing economies. 


































α ,       ( 4 )  
where j∈(d,g) denotes (foreign developed economies for region j, foreign developing economies 
for region j) and  j ss x * is the demand for foreign country goods j in region s;  j ss p * and  j ss* α are 
corresponding price and share parameters; and 
* ss σ  is the elasticity of substitution between the 
two foreign composite goods in region s.  
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α ,        ( 6 )    
where j∈(d,g), and now l denotes the 4 developed economies if j is in d, while l denotes the 4  9
developing economies if j is in g. In both cases l≠s.  sl x  gives the demand for other region 
goods; while sl p is the corresponding price,  sl α   are share parameters, and 
sj σ is the elasticity of 
substitution between either foreign developed or developing country goods depending on 
whether s is in d or g..  
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Equilibrium 
For this pure exchange economy, a global equilibrium involves endogenously determined 
prices for region specific goods such that 
s
s
ss x x = ∑                   ( 8 )  
where  s x  are the endowments of goods in region s.  
In a trade costless world,  
' ' s ss p p =           ( 9 )  
and as only relative prices are of any consequence, we can set the price of the U.S. good to one 
as the numerare, ie.    10
1 = u p    .           ( 1 0 )  
If transportation costs and tariff revenue are included in the model, prices in each region 
are linked and 
) 1 )( 1 ( ' ' ' ' ss ss s ss t p p τ + + =         ( 1 1 )  
where  ' s p  reflects the sellers price received by region s’ and  ' ss p  is the buying price of region 
s’ good in region s for the representative consumer in g, and  ' ss t  is the proportional 
transportation cost per unit from  ' s  to s , and  ' ss τ  is the tariff rate in s on the good imported 
from  ' s .  
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where the final term is tariff revenues assumed redistributed in lump sum form to the 
representative consumer in s. In equilibrium, in this case, if transportation costs are 
denominated in terms of the good transported, demands equal endowments less transportation 
costs, and government budgets in each region balance in terms of tariff revenues collected and 
redistributed. 
Data and Model Calibrations  11
We have calibrated this model to both 1975 and 2004 benchmark data in which we group 
the world into the 8 regions listed above. Merchandise trade flows for each year are from the 
Handbook of  Statistics (UNCTAD, 2006) and International Trade Statistics 2005 (WTO, 2006) and 
are valued on a F.O.B. basis. We have also included in the trade data international service trade 
flows which are also obtained from the Handbook of  Statistics (Tables 5.1, UNCTAD, 2006). 
Intra-region trade (largely within the EU 25) is not included in international trade flows in the 
model data under this treatment. To calculate these, we decompose service trade flow data for 
the regions weighted by their export and import shares in regional exports and imports 
separately, and take the average of international trade flows in services. We use the shares in 
1980 to represent the corresponding shares in 1975 since the data set starts from 1980. We treat 
the EU (25) as a single regional bloc even though the EU was smaller in earlier years. 
Tariff and non-tariff data are from Whalley (1985) for 1975 and Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2004) for 2004. Transportation cost data reflect differences between import data of 
importing countries and export data of exporting regions as in the Handbook of  Statistics 
(UNCTAD, 2006).  
To calibrate share parameters in preferences for the model, we use the same elasticity 
parameters employed by Whalley and Xin (2006) in a recent modeling evaluation of Canada US 
home bias in a global model. We use an elasticity of substitution of 2.0 for the top level  12
sub-utility function in each region, 2.5 for the second level sub-utility functions between the 
foreign developed and developing country goods, and 3.0 for the bottom level preferences in 
each region.  
Using these elasticity parameters and the 1975 and 2004 benchmark data we calibrate model 
share parameters for all three levels of preferences using first order conditions for utility 
maximizing behaviour. One way to evaluate whether the preferences of each region exhibit 
home bias or not is to also calibrate share parameters using trade neutral data absent of trade 
effects for the same year. The procedures to be employed in doing this involve keeping each 
regions total imports constant but replacing actual bilateral trade flows by trade data which are 
proportional to income allowing for trade costs and recalibrating the model (see Whalley and 
Xin (2006)). The parameterizations generated both by using actual and synthetic trade neutral 
data for both 1975 and 2004 are reported in Tables 1 and 2.  
These calibrated parameters not only suggest that preferences are not neutral within regions, 
but that there have been changes in preference structure in most regions in the last three 
decades. Comparing the differences between the share parameters calibrated to the observed 
data and neutral trade data suggests that in all regions except developed North America, 
developed Oceania, and developing America there is more bias in regional preferences for 
home goods in 2004 than in 1975. There is almost no change in home bias in developed  13
Oceania, while developed North America and developing America have become less home 
biased over the last three decades. These comparisons imply that international trade might have 
grown faster than otherwise if the 1975 preferences had persisted to 2004 and in this sense 
regionalization in the global economy has become more intense. We quantitatively assess the 
impacts of these changes in preferences on trade flows both jointly and separately in the next 
section. These preference changes thus underline the importance of examining the causes of 
growth of international trade from the demand side rather than the supply side only.   14
Table 1: Calibrated Share Parameters Using Actual 1975 Data and Synthetic Trade Neutral 
Region  Top Level  Second Level  Bottom Level for 
Developed Economies 
Bottom Level for 
Developing Economies 




EU US JP OD  AM AF AS SU 
Calibrated to 1975 Observed Data 
The EU(25)  0.537  0.463  0.347  0.653  --  0.457 0.313 0.230  0.192 0.218 0.285 0.304 
The U.S. and Canada  0.621  0.379  0.409  0.591 0.425  --  0.376  0.199  0.287 0.254 0.284 0.175 
Japan 0.537  0.463  0.451  0.549  0.293  0.425 -- 0.282 0.189  0.200  0.403  0.208 
Developed Oceania  0.553  0.447 0.677  0.323  0.407  0.320  0.273 --  0.165  0.155  0.518  0.163 
Developing America  0.508  0.492  0.619  0.381  0.333 0.357 0.224 0.086  --  0.287 0.389 0.323 
Developing Africa  0.432  0.568  0.722  0.278  0.383 0.257 0.271 0.089  0.319  --  0.467 0.214 
Developing Asia and Oceania  0.439  0.561  0.733 0.267  0.334  0.278  0.249  0.138 0.277  0.257 -- 0.466 
Other Europe and CIS  0.525  0.475  0.521  0.479  0.353 0.279 0.228 0.140 0.275  0.225  0.500 -- 
Calibrated to1975 Synthetic Trade Neutral Data 
The EU(25)  0.195  0.805  0.434  0.566  --  0.478 0.323 0.199  0.259 0.194 0.260 0.287 
The U.S. and Canada  0.189  0.811  0.437  0.563 0.484  --  0.319  0.197  0.259 0.194 0.260 0.287 
Japan 0.105  0.895  0.479  0.521  0.419  0.410 -- 0.171 0.259  0.194  0.260  0.287 
Developed Oceania  0.051  0.949 0.504  0.496  0.379  0.371  0.250 --  0.259  0.194  0.260  0.287 
Developing America  0.116  0.884  0.611  0.389  0.329 0.321 0.217 0.134 --  0.262  0.350  0.388 
Developing Africa  0.075  0.925  0.588  0.412  0.329 0.321 0.217 0.134  0.322  --  0.322 0.356 
Developing Asia and Oceania  0.116  0.884  0.611 0.389  0.329  0.321  0.217 0.134  0.350 0.262  --  0.388 
Other Europe and CIS  0.136  0.864  0.622  0.378  0.329 0.321 0.217 0.134 0.364  0.272  0.364 -- 
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Table 2: Calibrated Share Parameters using Actual 2004 Data and Synthetic Trade Neutral 
Region  Top Level  Second Level  Bottom Level for 
Developed Economies 
Bottom Level for 
Developing Economies 




EU US JP OD  AM AF AS SU 
Calibrated to 2004 Observed Data 
The EU(25)  0.594  0.406  0.360  0.640  --  0.469 0.344 0.187  0.181 0.198 0.330 0.290 
The U.S. and Canada  0.575  0.425  0.402  0.598 0.485  --  0.356  0.159  0.294 0.182 0.363 0.162 
Japan 0.613  0.387  0.451  0.549  0.366  0.395 -- 0.239 0.160  0.171  0.491  0.178 
Developed Oceania  0.542  0.458 0.537  0.463  0.389  0.333  0.278  --  0.126 0.154 0.509 0.211 
Developing America  0.504  0.496  0.642  0.358  0.315 0.432 0.160 0.092  --  0.241 0.395 0.364 
Developing Africa  0.495  0.505  0.591  0.409  0.414 0.265 0.187 0.134  0.257  --  0.491 0.253 
Developing Asia and Oceania  0.504  0.496  0.713 0.287  0.305  0.265  0.264  0.166 0.309  0.313 -- 0.378 
Other Europe and CIS  0.579  0.421  0.592  0.408  0.491 0.242 0.171 0.096 0.242  0.284  0.474 -- 
Calibrated to 2004 Synthetic Trade Neutral Data 
The EU(25)  0.197  0.803  0.447  0.553  --  0.469 0.345 0.186  0.230 0.166 0.317 0.287 
The U.S. and Canada  0.189  0.811  0.452  0.548 0.476  --  0.340  0.184  0.230 0.166 0.317 0.287 
Japan 0.119  0.881  0.486  0.514  0.424  0.412 -- 0.164 0.230  0.166  0.317  0.287 
Developed Oceania  0.047  0.953 0.519  0.481  0.372  0.362  0.266 --  0.230  0.166  0.317  0.287 
Developing America  0.092  0.908  0.611  0.389  0.326 0.316 0.233 0.126 --  0.215  0.412  0.373 
Developing Africa  0.057  0.943  0.591  0.409  0.326 0.316 0.233 0.126  0.275  --  0.380 0.344 
Developing Asia and Oceania  0.150  0.850  0.646 0.354  0.326  0.316  0.233  0.126 0.336  0.243 -- 0.421 
Other Europe and CIS  0.129  0.871  0.632  0.368  0.326 0.316 0.233 0.126 0.322  0.232  0.445 -- 
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3. Using 1975 and 2004 Calibrated Models to Assess the Impacts of Preference Changes 
on World Trade 
We have used our model calibrations for 1975 and 2004 to assess the impacts of preference 
changes on the growth of world trade. To do this, we use counterfactual analyses in which we 
jointly or separately substitute share parameters in preferences at different levels of the nesting 
structure in different regions between calibrations for the two years. We can substitute the 
parameters calibrated to 1975 data with parameters calibrated to 2004 data jointly or separately 
to obtain counterfactual trade flows in 1975. We can also substitute the parameters calibrated 
using 2004 data with parameters calibrated using 1975 data jointly or separately to obtain 
counterfactual trade flows in 2004. The differences between counterfactual and actual trade 
flows can then be attributed to changes in preferences. 
Counterfactual experiment results on 2004 trade flows in Table 3 show the impacts of 
changes in preferences for different region source goods between 1975 and 2004. In these we 
substitute 1975 preference shares into the model parameterization for 2004 and recompute an 
equilibrium. We can do this for all or each level of nest separately, and / or for individual sub 
groups, or all regions. These results show that preferences changes within these blocs have had 
substantial negative effects on the growth of world trade over the period of evaluation. Results 
imply that preference changes in the last three decades have reduced world trade by 27% (US$  17
1.7 trillion). Changing preferences only in developed or developing economies reduces world 
trade by 8% and 19%, respectively. Further decomposition results indicate that preference 
changes in the EU and Developing Asia and Oceania reduce world trade by 12% (US$ 0.73 
trillion) and 14% (US$ 0.910 trillion) of 2004 world trade, respectively. Preference changes in 
Japan reduce world trade by 5%, developing Asia 2%, other Europe and CIS 2%. In contrast, 
preference changes in developed America result in an increase of 8% (US$ 490 billion) in world 
trade in 2004, and in developing America of 1%.   
Results also show that preference changes only at the top level in all regions reduce world 
trade by 32% in 2004(US$ 2.04 trillion). For the developed economies the reduction is 12% 
(US$ 0.75 trillion) and for the developing economies 19% (US$ 1.19 trillion). Preference 
changes at the second level reduce world trade by a small amount (less than 1%) and at the 
bottom level, and in contrast, increase world trade by around 5% (US$ 0.32 trillion). These 
results imply that changes in preferences by level also have significant impacts on world trade.  
These results thus show that if the 1975 preference structure had persisted into 2004, world 
trade in 2004 would have been 27% higher than actual world trade. If instead the 1975 
preference structure had been replaced by that of 2004, parallel results (not reported in detail 
here) suggest that world trade in 1975 would be 18% lower than actual world trade (Table 4). 
These results thus support the position that in contrast to the conventional view of 
globalization of the world economy fuelling world trade growth, international trade among  18
major trade blocs has generally become more regionalized rather than globalized over the last 
three decades.    19
 
Table 3: Percentage Differences between Counterfactual and Actual Trade in 2009 both by region and globally (%) 
 
  Percentage change in trade relative to 
Actual Trade in 2004by substituting calibrated 
1975 shares into 2004 model parameterization












          
All Economies  27.3 32.2 0.6  -3.0  -2.1 
          
Developed Economies  8.2 11.8 0.3  -1.1  -2.5 
Developing Economies 18.6 18.8 0.3  -1.9  0.5 
          
The EU(25)  11.5 12.2 0.0  -0.3  -0.2 
The U.S. and Canada  -7.7 -6.2 0.0  -0.8  -1.1 
Japan 5.2 6.5 0.0  0.0  -0.9 
Developed Oceania  0.0 -0.2 0.2  0.0  0.0 
Developing America  -1.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.8  -0.2 
Developing Africa  2.4 1.9 0.5  -0.2  0.0 
Developing Asia and Oceania  14.4 12.3 0.5 0.6  0.5 
Other Europe and CIS  2.4 4.7 -0.6 -1.7  0.2 
Note: Summation may not apply due to rounding and, counterfactual experiment design.  20
Our numerical model and calibrated parameters also allow us to assess the impacts of 
changes in income levels, income convergence, and trade costs on world trade growth in a multi 
region general equilibrium model in contrast to the gravity model used by Baier and Bergstrand 
(2001). Results are reported in Table 4. They suggest that income growth (modelled as growth 
in regional endowments) resulted in US$ 5.2 trillion world trade in 2004 and explains 76% of 
the growth of world trade in the last three decades. Income convergence explains a further 4% 
of the growth of world trade. Falling trade costs (tariffs, non-tariffs, and transportation costs) 
collectively contribute around 7% of the growth of world trade in the last three decades. 
Table 4: Changing Preferences and the Growth of World Trade 
Experiments  World Trade (10 
billion,%) 
1975 observed world trade  660 
2004 observed world trade  6330 
Percentage changes compared to 1975     860% 
  
  
2004 World trade under other counterfactual Experiments    
Income growth (excluding income convergence)  4970 
Share of world trade growth explained  76% 
Setting 1975 regional endowments to 2004 regional endowments (i.e 
including income convergence) 
5200 
                 Share of w orld trade gro wth explained   80% 
Setting 1975 trade costs to 2004 trade costs  1050 
Share of world trade growth explained  7% 
4. Concluding Remarks 
Ignoring preference change can be misleading in any assessment of cause of global trade  21
growth. Here, we use a 3-level nested CES numerical model of a global pure exchange economy 
composed of 8 bloc regions; the EU(25), developed North America, Japan, developed Oceania, 
developing America, developing Africa, developing Asia and Oceania, other Europe and CIS 
and calibrate our model to data for 1975 and 2004. We are then able to replace preferences of 
one year by those of another allowing for an assessment of the contribution of preference 
change to world trade. Model results suggest that changes in preferences for different regionally 
sourced goods have had substantially negative effects on the growth of world trade among 
major blocs over the last three decades. Thus, in contrast to the conventional view of 
globalization of the world economy, we find a trend of international trade regionalization 
among major blocs. 
 In conclusion, we note that our analysis raises as well as resolves a number of issues. Why 
preferences within blocs for own goods have changed in this way is not analyzed, and may well 
reflect increased inter bloc trade from regional trade agreements (although this would not be the 
case in Japan). Also, we have not analyzed whether regionalization is also occurring within blocs 
due to the added detail involved in data. We leave these issues for further work.    22
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